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Introduction 
Concern about reaching the targets set by the UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) has galvanised questions surrounding the need for alternative models of 
global governance that respond more effectively to the challenge of poverty 
reduction. One response to such questions has been the suggestion of more 
inclusive, multi-level governance. Multi-level governance refers to a disaggregation 
of power at the global, national, and community level, that involves new structures 
of co-ordination and planning drawn up between the private and public sector. Its 
emphasis is on inclusion of multiple actors and ideas that provide the space for 
‘innovative’ solutions to the complex issue of poverty reduction. This paper 
explores the limitations of multi-level governance as a mechanism of governing 
poverty reduction. It does so by considering the experiences and lessons from 
global health governance and what multi-level governance is in practice. The paper 
argues that despite presenting the opportunity for more inclusive, innovative and 
participatory forms of governance, multi-level governance embeds wider problems 
of governing poverty. As global health interventions show, multi-level health 
governance is highly centralised and organised around a distorted separation of 
power that reduces the conceptual and practical space for different actors to 
operate. In this sense, it presents a form of bad governance that rests on confusion 
and hidden decision-making. 
The paper develops this argument in the following way. First it outlines the 
problem of governing poverty reduction and why multi-level governance presents a 
possible solution. Second, the paper outlines what multi-level governance is and 
how it is understood in the context of the European Union (EU) and debates on 
deliberative democracy. Third, the paper traces the emergence of multi-level 
governance within global health strategies. Fourth, the practical ramifications of 
multi-level governance are explored to suggest that in practice, this form of 
governance does not offer a change towards inclusive models of poverty reduction. 
The paper then considers the implications of multi-level governance for sustained 
poverty reduction, before offering several conclusions as to the nature and role of 
multi-level governance in providing an alternative to current understandings and 
practice of global governance.  
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Crisis, poverty reduction and the need for governance ‘innovation’ 
The governance of poverty reduction has consistently received criticism for the 
practices, structures and presence of particular actors committed to alleviating 
extreme poverty, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. This criticism usually falls into 
one of the following categories: i) a general critique of foreign aid, predominantly by 
ex-employees of the World Bank; ii) blame the state; iii) blame the institutions; and 
iv) the failings of the good governance agenda as the main mechanism in which to 
achieve sustained poverty reduction. The first criticism is less about governance, 
but the presence of foreign aid as a strategy for alleviating poverty. This critique 
suggests that foreign aid – either bilateral or multilateral assistance to a country – 
does more harm that good, creating a dependency culture and less incentive for 
developing countries to engage in reforms.1 A modification of this argument, is that 
there is too much aid, or that aid needs to be more selective and contribute to 
initiatives that are sustainable.2 This line of argument suggests a need for less 
‘charitable’ giving and more infrastructure-based and long-term credit initiatives for 
‘the poor’ to work themselves out of poverty.3 Thus the problem with poverty 
governance is that it relies heavily on foreign aid, most of which is mis-spent and 
lacks clear objectives or goals. Much of this critique has now been adopted by 
international aid agencies; whilst aid has not been suspended, the last twenty 
years have seen a shift towards more infrastructure and long-term seed investment 
strategies.  
The second critique refers to the familiar problem of the state and how to 
construct political will to make the necessary changes to allow growth to flourish 
and create the space for poverty strategies to work. This approach rests on the 
notion that it is not the strategies that are the problem, but the states that 
implement them. States some how ignore, subvert, bureaucratise, embezzle 
money or engage in corrupt practice so that aid does not get to those that it was 
intended for.4 States lack the capacity to manage the demands and interests 
placed upon them and foreign aid creates rent-seeking behaviour. This leads to 
                                                 
1 D. Moyo, Dead aid: why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa (London: 
Penguin, 2009) 
2 J. Sachs, The end of poverty: how we can make it happen in our lifetime (London: Penguin, 2005); 
S.C. Smith, Ending global poverty: a guide to what works (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005) 
3 W. Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill 
and so little good (London: Penguin, 2006) 
4 P.T. Bauer, Dissent on Development (Revised edition) (London: Harvard University Press, 1976); 
R. Klitgaard, Controlling corruption (London: University of California Press, 1991); R. Klitgaard, 
‘International co-operation against corruption’ Finance and Development March 1998; J. Svensson, 
‘When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality’ Journal of International 
Development 61, 2000: 61-84 
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questions as to the credibility of aid5 as the primary tool of governance initiatives in 
combating poverty, and its relationship to economic growth. The problem with 
poverty governance here is that it relies too much on state support and funding 
streams that operate in partnership with national governments, which at worse 
engage in large-scale corruption and human rights abuses, and at best have 
complex bureaucracies or their own poverty strategies that restrict the 
effectiveness of external support. This critique has led to a widespread blame-the-
state mentality that foreign aid agencies and institutions use as justification for 
conditional-based lending, without considering the mechanisms, policies and 
culture of their own institutions in failing to deliver successful outcomes for the 
world’s poor.  
This lack of recognition or gap in accountability is covered by the third 
critique of poverty governance, that of international institutions, predominantly the 
international financial institutions (IFIs). From criticism over the long-term negative 
impact of structural adjustment and conditional-based lending,6 to the 
Comprehensive Development Framework and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers,7 the World Bank has received the majority of criticism aimed at the 
financial institutions when it comes to governing poverty. This is in part the Bank’s 
fault, for positioning itself as the largest multilateral lender to development projects 
and country assistance to developing countries, and declaring its dream to be a 
‘world free from poverty.’ On the other hand, the Bank has suffered from failing 
projects; poor management and overly bureaucratic procedure; bad advice; a 
narrow policy paradigm that relies too heavily on growth and the primacy of the 
market and the private sector; lack of proper engagement  with the governments it 
seeks to partner; and criticism from ex staff members.8 Criticisms of the 
                                                 
5 Svensson, 2000 
6 R. Hopkins, A. Powell, A. Roy, and C. Gilbert, C. ‘The World Bank and Conditionality’ Journal of 
International Development 9(4), 1997: 507-516; P. Mosley, J. Harrigan, and J. Toye Aid and power: 
the World Bank and policy-based lending (2nd edition) (London: Routledge, 1991)   
7 P. Cammack, ‘The mother of all governments: the World Bank’s matrix for global governance,’ in 
R. Wilkinson and S. Hughes (eds) Global Governance: Critical Perspectives  (London: Routledge, 
2002) 36-53; P. Cammack, ‘What the World Bank means by poverty reduction and why it matters,’ 
New Political Economy 9(2), 2004: 189-211; M. Goldman, Imperial Nature: the World Bank and 
struggles for social justice in the age of globalizaton (London: Yale University Press, 2005); G. 
Harrison, ‘HIPC and the Architecture of Governance’ Review of African Political Economy 31(99), 
2004:125-164; G. Standing,‘Brave new words? A critique of Stiglitz’s World Bank rethink,’ 
Development and Change 31, 2000: 737-763; C. Weaver, and R.J. Leiteritz, ‘Our poverty is a world 
full of dreams:’ reforming the World Bank’ Global Governance 11, 2005: 369 – 388 
8 R. Wade, ‘Showdown at the World Bank,’ New Left Review 15(2), 2001: 124-137; J. Stiglitz, ‘The 
World Bank at the millennium’ The Economic Journal 109(459), 1999: 577-597; J. Stiglitz, 
‘Democratizing the IMF and the World Bank: Governance and Accountability,’ Governance 16(1), 
2003: 111-139 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) tend to focus on poor advice of the 1980s and 
1990s,9 but have failed to be as sustained and complex as they are towards the 
Bank. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the free trade policies it promotes 
receive similar criticism for the structural limitations and bias against developing 
countries. UN agencies such as UNDP receive less of a critique, but mainly 
because they are seen as being somewhat secondary in terms of decision-making 
to the IFIs. What this critique suggests about the governance of poverty is that it is 
highly centralised, and the global area of governance refers to predominantly IFIs, 
and the pursuit of co-operation or dominance by key states through these 
institutions.  
It is this highly centralised nature and bias towards key member states that 
suggests a lack of good governance on the part of these institutions, and the need 
for more inclusive, participatory forms of governance that involve developing 
countries and ‘the poor.’ The ‘new’ era of engagement with states, civil society and 
the private sector through initiatives such as the poverty reduction strategy papers 
have failed to deliver, hence the need for more innovative approaches to 
successfully reach the MDGs. This new era of engagement relates to a common 
theme shared between these three critiques of poverty governance: good 
governance, or moreover a lack of it within the state and international aid agencies 
and institutions. Despite efforts and claims to the contrary, good governance based 
on accountability, representation, transparency, and clearer monitoring and 
evaluation systems is lacking in every arena of poverty governance, especially 
within the IFIs such as the World Bank,10 and the IMF.11 It is this gap in good 
governance that multi-level governance seeks to fulfil.   
The critiques of poverty governance suggest that it is somehow in crisis. The 
MDG deadline of 2015 is fast approaching at a time when funding to international 
aid and development assistance is threatened to be squeezed on account of the 
subprime crisis. Mechanisms to address poverty alleviation have become stagnant, 
with little time or space to re-evaluate the path governance has gone down. 
                                                 
9 M. Fratianni, M, ‘The IMF and its critics’ in M. Ratianni and P.Savona (eds) Sustaining growth and 
development: G7 and IMF Governance (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); M. Hodd, ‘Africa, the IMF and 
the World Bank’ African Affairs 86(344), 1987: 331-342; R. Peet, Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World 
Bank and WTO (London: Zed Books, 2003) 
10 N. Woods, ‘The challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World Bank themselves,’ 
World Development 28(5), 1999: 823-841; N. Woods, ‘Making the IMF and World Bank more 
accountable’ International Affairs 77(1), 2001: 83-100; N. Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the 
World Bank and their borrowers (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006) 
11 S. Soederberg, ‘Grafting stability onto globalization? Deconstructing the IMF’s recent bid for 
transparency’ Third World Quarterly 22(5), 2001 
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Critiques of existing interventions and the need for a new approach lead to 
widespread calls for ‘innovation’ in terms of technology, service delivery, and ideas 
as to how best address the problem of global poverty. In theory, multi-level 
governance provides the space for such innovations to occur. The purpose of 
multi-level governance is to allow for inclusionary forms of decision-making in such 
a way that it overcomes problems of state hijacking or co-operation, and 
dominance of highly centralised global institutions, as well as promoting 
decentralisation of decision-making and the responsiveness of global governance 
to new and emerging problems associated with global poverty alleviation. 
Moreover, it allows for the private sector to flourish, channel funds to encourage 
civil society inclusion and thus disperse decision-making away from state-centred 
forms of global governance and look for funding streams that do not directly draw 
from the public purse. To measure the success and ability of multi-level 
governance to overcome shortcomings in poverty alleviation strategies it is 
important to consider different interpretations of the concept. 
 
What is multi-level governance? 
The term multi-level governance has principally been applied to the EU and models 
of integration. Multi-level governance in this regard refers to the sharing of authority 
and policy-making across subnational, national and supranation levels of 
government,12 as well as the public, private and voluntary sector.13 The state is still 
of paramount concern and multi-level governance has a statist core, but it does not 
have monopoly over decision-making and must share power:14 subnational 
decision-making exists beyond the scope or ‘nest’ of the state15 and shared 
sovereignty exists in that external actors have influence over domestic authority.16 
This form of governance relies less on an ‘inside-outsider’ power relationship within 
the EU and thus facilitates greater openness and access to decision-making for 
interest groups.  
                                                 
12 G. Marks, L. Hoooghe, K. Blank, ‘European integration from the 1980s: state-centric vs. multi-
level governance’ Journal of Common Market Studies 34(3), 1996: 341 – 378 
13 I. Bache and R. Chapman, ‘Democracy through multilevel governance? The implementation of 
the structural funds in South Yorkshire’ Governance 21(3), 2008: 397 – 418 
14 R. Eising, ‘Multilevel governance and business interests in the European Union’ Governance 
17(2), 2004: 211 – 245 
15 Marks et al 1996 
16 H.M Mamudu and D.T. Studler, D.T. ‘Multilevel governance and shared sovereignty: EU, member 
states and the FCTC’ Governance 22(1), 2009: 73 – 97 
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Multi-level governance has also been represented by the terms polycentric 
governance, fragmentation, rescaling, multi-tiered governance17 and multi-
sectoralism. According to Hooghe and Marks there are two forms of multi-level 
governance: i) that which resemble a federalist system; and ii) a more fluid, form 
that ‘consists of innumerable jurisdictions’ that overlap and is organised around 
specific policy sector and issues.18 Both of these definitions are of interest to 
understanding global governance, the first appeals to those interested in global 
political systems and the formation of world government, whereas the second has 
become increasingly salient in understanding complex regimes and governance 
structures organised around issues such as the environment and climate change. 
The use of a multi-level analysis has allowed for a conceptualisation of global 
environmental governance that does not isolate or ignore the state in the same 
way regime-based or transnational understandings are said to do.19 In this sense, it 
gives the ‘conceptual space’ to understand the complexity of such governance. 
This conceptual space is part of what makes multi-level governance appear 
convincing and useful as a mode of analysis, especially when understood in 
conjunction with understandings of deliberation and deliberative democracy. Multi-
level governance provides space for inclusion of civil society and global civil society 
both within and outside processes of global governance as an arena or ‘a space for 
critical reflection and affective expression.’20 Different forms of multi-level 
governance, such as multi-sectoral governance that points to the inclusion of all 
aspects of society in decision-making, shift the focus away from state-centred, 
institutional narrative of power and agenda-setting to allow for greater recognition 
of both deliberations within civil society and between civil society and international 
institutions. Multi-level governance in this respect confers a degree of 
‘communicative power’ through the use of ‘minipublics.’21 Hence, in the long term 
multi-level governance presents the opportunity for democratising global 
governance. Processes of deliberation can be provided by institutional design22 
                                                 
17 A. Harmes, A. ‘Neoliberalism and multilevel governance’ Review of International Political 
Economy 13(5), 2006: 725 - 749 
18 Bache and Chapman 2008; L. Hooghe and G. Marks, Multi-level governance and European 
Integration (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001) 
19 M.M Betsill and H. Bulkeley, ‘Cities and the multilevel governance of global climate change’ 
Global Governance 13, 2006: 141 – 159 
20 J. Brassett and W. Smith, ‘Deliberation and global civil society: agency, arena, affect’ Review of 
International Studies 36(2), 2010: 413 – 430 
21 J. Bohman, ‘Democratising the global order: from communicative freedom to communicative 
power’ Review of International Studies 36(2), 2010: 431 - 447 
22 Bohman 2010 
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that allows for ‘a range of approaches’ to ‘globally just’ decision-making.23 It is this 
democratising function and potential that has facilitated development policy 
strategies in areas such as global health that seek to integrate forms of multi-level 
governance. 
The potential of multi-level governance to overcome the shortcomings or 
democratic deficit of global governance must, however, be understood in the wider 
context of social and economic forces that condition and/or restrict global decision-
making processes. Problems of accountability rise when ‘many agents’ and with 
‘many hands’ have to agree to a decision that appeals to the ‘many eyes’ watching 
the system of governance.24 Deliberation and inclusion through multi-level 
governance is in many ways tokenistic and occurs within a neoliberal paradigm for 
decision-making. According to Harmes, multi-level governance is part of an explicit 
normative project of neoliberalism that is consistently applied to federal, regional 
and global levels.25 The ‘underlying logic’ of which is the separation of the 
economic and the political through legal mechanisms and governmental 
bargaining, or what Gill terms the discipline of ‘new constitutionalism.’26 Hence 
multi-level governance is not just about opening the space for greater inclusion of 
multiple actors and decisions, but this happens within a particular neoliberal space 
that uses inclusion and the rhetoric of sovereignty as a means of separating the 
political and economic. This can clearly be seen in the application of multi-level 
governance to global health and wider frameworks of poverty governance. As the 
following section will show, despite presenting the image of inclusive and ‘apolitical’ 
governance, on application multi-level governance exists within a wider paradigm 
of neoliberal separation of the economic, political and social that in effect provides 
limited deliberation and apolitical democratisation. On paper multi-level governance 
provides an effective solution to some of the reach, accountability and inclusion 
problems underpinning the governance of poverty, but in practice it embeds these 
problems further. 
                                                 
23 P. Newell, ‘Democratising biotechnology? Deliberation, participation and social regulation in a 
neoliberal world’ Review of International Studies 36(2), 2010: 471 – 491; G.W. Brown, 
‘Safeguarding deliberative global governance: the case of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria’ Review of International Studies 36(2), 2010: 511-530 
24 A. Benz, ‘Accountable multilevel governance by the open method of co-ordination?’ European 
Law Journal 13(4), 2007: 505-522; M. Bovens ‘Analysing and assessing accountability: a 
conceptual framework’ European Law Journal 13(4), 2007: 447 – 468 
25 Harmes 2006 
26 Harmes 2006; S. Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’ 
Millennium 24(3), 1995; S. Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratisation, and Global Political 
Economy’, R Wilkinson (ed.), The Global Governance Reader (London: Routledge, 2005) 174 – 186 
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Multi-level governance and global health 
Multi-level governance has been applied to global health through ‘multi-sectoral’ 
policy designs and initiatives. Multi-sectoralism has its roots in the World Health 
Organisation (WHO)’s 1978 Alma Ata Declaration that acknowledged health for all 
through an emphasis on primary healthcare. Primary healthcare would be achieved 
through a combination of international and state funds and local, direct 
responses.27 This emphasis on inclusion of multiple actors and levels of service 
delivery has permeated through global health initiatives, particularly within the 
discourse of the new public health. The new public health has sought to prove the 
explicit linkages between poverty and development and poor health and the spread 
of disease. Much of this literature has focused on the relationship between 
globalisation and exacerbated health inequalities.28 Globalisation has stimulated 
inequalities in global health through restriction of access to treatment through the 
distorting affects of trade policies and global financial markets,29 cutting of public 
spending in healthcare and thus poorly staffed and resourced health centres in 
developing countries,30 economic migration that has facilitated the spread of 
infectious disease, changing family relationships, and greater complexity to the 
causes and treatment of disease. On the other side of the argument, globalisation 
has allowed for the spread of financial investment in health interventions, the 
introduction of the private sector in developing countries to elicit greater value for 
money in health outcomes, and the movement of health workers and the sharing of 
health expertise and biomedical research. Globalisation has made health or 
international health a global issue that makes individuals and states interdependent 
in terms of health outcomes and the threat and spread of infectious disease. The 
                                                 
27 K. Lee and H. Goodman, H. ‘Global policy networks: the propagation of health care financing 
reform since the 1980s’ in K. Lee, K. Buse, and S. Fustukian (eds) Health in a globalising world 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 97-119 
28 M. Larkin, ‘Globalisation and health’ in J. Green and R. Labonte (eds) Critical Perspectives in 
Public Health (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); K. Lee, S. Fustukian, and K. Buse, ‘An introduction to 
global health policy’ in K. Lee, S. Fustukian and K. Buse (eds) Health Policy in a Globalising World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
29 R. Labonte, C. Blouin, and L. Forman, ‘Trade and health’ in A. Kay and O.D. Williams (eds) 
Global Health Governance: crisis, institutions and political economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); 
T. Schrecker, ‘The power of money: global financial markets, national politics and social 
determinants of health’ in A. Kay and O.D. Williams (eds) Global Health Governance: crisis, 
institutions and political economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009) 
30 R.P Buckley and J. Baker, ‘IMF policies and health in sub-Saharan Africa’ in A. Kay and O.D. 
Williams (eds) Global Health Governance: crisis, institutions and political economy (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2009); R. Loewenson, ‘Structural adjustment and health policy in Africa’ Radical Journal 
of Health 1, 1995: 49 – 61 
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application of multi-level governance to global health has been both a part of 
globalisation and a response to the inequalities it creates. 
Globalisation has led to a multiplicity of actors being involved in global 
health. Provision of health outcomes and the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health for individuals is no longer based on a loose social contract 
between the state and the individual. It now involves government agencies, non-
governmental organisations, private providers, international donors and community 
groups. Moreover, recognition that infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS are a 
global security threat by United Nations Security Council Resolutions and General 
Assembly Special Session recommendations31 has led states to co-operate in 
addressing such epidemics through measures such as border control, aid and 
development, and co-ordination through intergovernmental organisations. At the 
local level, globalisation demands increased involvement of local community 
groups, as well as national and international non-governmental organisations to 
plug the gaps in public spending, and deliver cheap and affordable interventions. 
Beyond the increase in the number and scope of such actors, the inter-relationship 
between poverty and health makes addressing health less about sickness or 
treatment of the ill, but more encompassing of eradicating the structural socio-
economic factors that drive illness, risk, and well-being. The result of such logic is 
the need to involve non-health specific actors and initiatives in combating health 
problems. 
Applied to practice, the presence of multiple health actors and the need to 
stimulate wider involvement in health interventions requires a specific form of multi-
level governance to co-ordinate and initiate various activities at the individual, 
community, state and global level. This specific form of multilevel governance has 
manifested itself through sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) to health or multi-
sectoralism.32 These approaches were first introduced to global health 
interventions in the late 1980s and early 1990s when structural adjustment 
programmes were having the effect of an overall reduction in health spending,33 
                                                 
31 UNGASS UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS 
(UNGASS): Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS (New York: UN, 2001); United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1308 (SCRes 1308) (17 July 2000) http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/536/02/PDF/N0053602.pdf?OpenElement (accessed February 
2010) 
32 S. Harman ‘The World Bank and Health’ in A. Kay and O.D. Williams Global Health Governance: 
Crisis, Institutions and Political Economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009a) 
33 K. Buse, ‘Spotlight on international organisations: the World Bank’ Health Policy and Planning 
9(1), 1994: 95 – 99; S. A. Zaidi, ‘Planning the health sector: for whom, by whom?’ Social Science 
and Medicine 39(9), 1994: 1385 – 1393 
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and the need for community and private based initiatives to work with the state to 
facilitate outcomes in the areas of malaria, tuberculosis and neglected disease. 
During this time the WHO emphasised the need sector-wide or multi-sectoral 
approaches to circumvent cuts in public spending, to attract attention to health 
concerns, and to recognise the inter-relationship between poverty and ill-health. 
This emphasis led to the broadening of health policy and projects to include actors 
beyond the health sector. It was not, however, until the discovery of HIV/AIDS in 
the early 1980s and recognition of the impact it was having in developing countries, 
most notably sub-Saharan Africa, did the application of multi-sectoralism come into 
full effect.34 
The exceptionalism of HIV/AIDS as both a driver and outcome of poverty 
and the stigma and denial surrounding the disease stimulated the need for non-
health specific interventions. Interventions within the health sector alone did not 
and could not address the drivers of the epidemic alone. The result of which was 
the widespread application of multi-sectoralism through projects by the World Bank 
and the Multi-Country AIDS Program in the first instance, and then the Global Fund 
to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The multi-sectoral approach in which 
every aspect of society is included in the fight against HIV/AIDS at every level of 
governance remains the dominant paradigm in which HIV/AIDS interventions are 
organised.35 The relative success or presence of such multi-sectoral systems has 
seen cross-over not only into more mainstreamed multi-sectoral interventions into 
tuberculosis and malaria, but towards maternal health programmes and neglected 
diseases. One of the key drivers of putting multisectoral governance into practice 
has been the World Bank. Multi-sectoralism is the embodiment of World Bank 
practice and the anti-poverty paradigm established by the good governance, 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) approach of the late 1990s.36 
In practice, multisectoral or sector-wide approaches to health governance 
take the following form. The first component is the identification and removal of the 
health concern out of the Ministry of Health within the government and into a 
specialised agency in the cabinet office, the Office of the President or Prime 
                                                 
34 S. Harman, ‘The Causes, Contours and Consequences of Multi-Sectoralism within the HIV/AIDS 
response’ in S. Harman and F. Lisk (eds) Governance of HIV/AIDS Responses: Making 
Participation and Accountability Count (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009b) 
35 S. Harman, The World Bank and HIV/AIDS: Setting a Global Agenda (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2010) 
36 Harman 2010; S. Harman, ‘The World Bank: Failing the Multi-Country AIDS Program (MAP): 
Failing HIV/AIDS’ Global Governance 13(4), 2007: 485-492 
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Minister. This is to signify the importance of the issue, and to recognise that the 
health concern is of relevance to poverty and development, and thus requires 
interventions that go beyond health. The funding of such an agency is done by the 
government and an international donor, for example the World Bank or the Global 
Fund. This agency is the primary site of co-ordination and management of multi-
level governance at the state level. It is not to replace the Ministry of Health, but to 
work alongside it. The agency in central government is to be complemented by 
regional and district partners through a decentralised structure of authority and 
decision-making, with clear structures that feedback local concern to the state. The 
second component is the inclusion of civil society organisations within this agency, 
or the need to generate civil society participation at the national, district and 
community levels of interaction. The most straightforward way of doing so is the 
provision of financial incentive. The third element is the need for individuals within a 
local community to take ‘ownership’ of the problem, which means providing care, 
treatment and support services on a voluntary basis. They are then to be linked-in 
to the wider structures of this form of health governance through the local 
decentralised equivalent of the health agency and community groups or non-
governmental organisation. Where necessary these individuals or groups must 
participate in government feedback processes and consultation. The fourth factor is 
the need for one co-ordinating agency among international aid donors that works 
with the government lead agency to effectively interact and deliver between 
multiple actors and directives. This is to promote donor harmony and to avoid any 
overlaps or ‘double-dipping’ of aid. Fifth, the private sector, and public-private 
partnerships must be established through funding and financial incentive to provide 
‘innovative’ solutions to health concerns and break with the stringent and 
bureaucratic nature of state-based directives. The sixth tool of co-ordination is the 
presence of one strategic plan or over-arching strategy that all actors must adhere 
to. The multi-sectoral approach is at the heart of such plans. The final constituent 
part of this form of multi-level governance is the need for high-level declarations 
within international institutions that bind member states to financial and political 
commitments surrounding specific health issues. The purpose of which is to secure 
sustained support and global recognition of health interventions as problems of 
global poverty and development. In some instances the application of multi-
sectoralism requires regional co-ordination, but this is less the case in health 
interventions that operate along the axis of global-state-community-individual. 
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Regional actors have little involvement in these areas, although, in the case of 
actors such as the African Union this is part of their remit and likely to grow in the 
future. 
The model of multi-level governance through multi-sectoral health 
interventions provides some solutions to the problems of governing poverty. It 
decentralises decision-making by putting the state at the centre of co-ordination 
practices and agenda-setting and introducing more decentralised systems of 
governance towards local government and civil society. This should have the net 
effect of making governance structures more responsive to the needs of local ‘on 
the ground’ issues. The presence of multiple actors increase accountability and 
transparency mechanisms as they in theory represent a clear separation of power 
and would thus act as a check on each other. Developing countries appear very 
much in the driving seat of development through these government agencies and 
large-scale civil society presence, with the international community co-ordinated to 
provide technical financial assistance. At the very least, these factors open up 
wider space for deliberation and participation within global governance. However, 
as the next section will show, in practice the application of multi-level governance 
to health as a poverty concern has several limitations. 
 
Multi-level governance in practice: the problems of apolitical development 
The application of multi-sectoralism in global health interventions provides a clear 
example of multi-level governance in practice. In involves the dual process of 
decentralisation and globalisation of policy-making and service delivery and in 
many ways provides a workable solution to the problem of unbalanced, state-
centric global governance. However, the practical outcomes of each of the 
constituent elements of multi-sectoralism suggest limited deliberation and 
participation by state-based actors, and re-orientation towards global arenas of 
decision-making and agenda-setting.  
The centre of multi-sectoral activity is within the state. The state co-
ordinates and manages every aspect of multi-level governance but is susceptible to 
demands from international donors and institutions. This is because these co-
ordinating state agencies were introduced by international institutions,37 and the 
scope to set the national agenda and shape policy decisions can only exist within 
the wider remit of multi-sectoral interventions established in Washington and 
                                                 
37 Harman 2010, p56-57 
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Geneva. Without international intervention key health issues would have remained 
in the remit of the Ministry of Health.38 This leads to a discrepancy over who owns 
health interventions, between these specialist agencies and the Ministry of Health, 
and between the government and those donors who are able to set the agenda.39 
The decentralised structure of these government agencies introduces an additional 
layer of bureaucracy, confusion and loss of transparency at the local level.40 Multi-
sectoral interventions in practice construct a specific form of multi-level governance 
that separates health from health planning, and the state from the wider features of 
national or local politics by emphasising the functional nature of their role and the 
importance of promoting better health and eradicating disease through more 
structural, non-health specific interventions. 
This separation of health from the health sector or the political realm is 
further reflected in the second key element of multi-sectoral intervention: inclusion 
of civil society groups. The onus here is on local community groups as the most 
efficient and cost-effective means of service delivery. Beyond provision, the 
purpose of civil society inclusion is to act as a check and balance on the state, and 
broaden the scope of health to address the cultural and socio-economic drivers of 
poor health and disease. However, the broadening and inclusion of civil society is 
driven by the state, with the state highlighting familiar actors it wants to support 
both politically and financially, and processes of deliberation being highly formal 
and structured by government agencies.41 Civil society thus comes to represent 
less of a ‘third sphere’ of political activity, but more a low cost extension of state 
services. Dependency on funding and the origins of that funding makes it hard for 
civil society to become independent observers of the process or to fully control or 
direct the agenda in response to local demands, as in practice local demands are 
often only met when they fall into pre-established strategic priorities.42 This has 
particularly important implications for local community groups, the individual and 
society in developing countries. Individuals are unable to direct or advise as to 
what interventions or policies would best help support them, yet are to provide their 
services free. This restricts the political agency of individuals and local 
communities as they become trapped in the need to elicit funds to support 
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themselves, whilst narrowing the political space for alternative, or any meaningful 
deliberation as to what their needs or wants are. 
The emphasis on one strategic plan or project to organise multi-level health 
governance around narrows the space of decision-making and inclusion further. 
There is little point in having multiple actors, with multiple points of view and 
projects if they are excluded from the process of governance because they do not 
adhere to one strategic plan. Adherence to one strategic plan by its very nature 
restricts notions of polyarchy as it outlines the limits and language of participation 
in which all actors must pursue, as well as the rules for participation. Any exception 
to the rule is seen as a form of bad governance, or the wrong type of health 
intervention, and thus restricted from funding streams and engagement in decision-
making or agenda-setting.43 Criticism and alternative ideas and views on health 
interventions can exist outside of this plan, but the limited scope for full deliberation 
with these dissenting voices restricts full multilevel governance as a form of 
polyarchy. Analysis of specific health issues occurs within the confines of policy-
making and has the net effect of pigeon-holing issues and prescribing interventions 
that are broad in scope but narrow in conceptual clarity.  
This narrowing of political space is less of a problem for actors from the for-
profit private sector. These actors also undergo a process of becoming embedded 
within the structures of the state, but are able to sustain their independence as 
state resources are not their primary form of income. Private actors are often 
involved in multi-level forms of governance for specified tasks or through the 
introduction of new ‘innovations’ or developments. The reification and need for new 
solutions to sustained problems, e.g. new vaccines and new, more accessible and 
improved medicines, gives the private sector a degree of self-legitimacy. States 
and civil society actors often lack the funds or expertise to fully hold such actors to 
account; and where they can, private actors have the ability to leave such a state, 
or opt out of a policy initiative that does not suit their organisation’s objectives. The 
private sector relies on systems of self-regulatory practice, with limited 
mechanisms of transparency to the state, civil society or the individual. Hence, 
inclusion of the private sector often makes multi-level governance less accountable 
and transparency, as consumer choice is narrow, with little knowledge or scope to 
hold these actors to account, specifically in health interventions where policy-
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makers are dependent on innovation and generous licensing arrangements for new 
drugs, treatment, and prevention strategies. 
The central constraint on multi-level governance as a solution to the 
shortcomings and lack of good poverty governance is the role of international 
institutions. The role of international institutions within multi-level governance is to 
provide a co-ordination function, expertise and financial support to states, the 
private sector and civil society in delivering sustainable outcomes for global health 
interventions. However, in practice the scope of these institutions is much broader, 
with organisations such as the World Bank able to set the agenda through multi-
sectoral state institutions.44 This can be seen in the case of donor co-ordinating 
committees. Co-ordinating committees are not only to avoid overlap, but present 
the opportunity to bring actors in line with clear objectives. Similar to the national 
strategic plan, these committees have a specific working culture that prioritises 
certain practices or institutions over others. With older, multilateral institutions 
having more sway than newer or bilateral institutions. This is because of longevity, 
closer links to the government, and the ideas that these organisations are in some 
way ‘non-political’ honest brokers. However, in presenting themselves as non-
political agencies with no state-led objectives, these organisations have far higher 
reach. They are able to recommend multi-sectoral interventions and a shift away 
from the Ministry of Health, use their ‘expertise’ to outline the central components 
of the strategic plan, and most importantly establish a government agency within 
the highest level of political office. Decision-making remains highly centralised in 
international institutions, consensual and operative at the state level, and then 
delivered at low cost at the community level: those international institutions that are 
presented as non-political, with large amounts, and more importantly, sustained 
levels of funding have the greatest influence. The core of what health governance 
is about has become blurred through multi-level governance to the stage where it is 
now about anything but health. 
The net effect of these structures of multi-level health governance is limited 
transparency, accountability and representation, and thus an embedding of the bad 
form of governance seen in wider processes of global poverty governance. The 
multiple actors involved in multi-level governance make it difficult to identify who is 
responsible for what and how and to whom they are accountable. There is a clear 
delineation of roles and responsibilities, but on clearer inspection they do not 
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appear as they seem. States do not co-ordinate, agenda-set or organise strategic 
plans independent of international donors, and those international donors prefer to 
have a hidden role so as to promote state legitimacy. This leads to a confusion 
over to who is being held to account for national health policies and how.45 Civil 
society organisations are unable to hold those state agencies and international 
donors to account as they suffer from a conflict of interest as these are the very 
agencies they receive funds from. Civil society activity is primarily located within 
localised communities who often have limited access to decision-making or 
knowledge as to the structures and processes of health governance to hold actors 
to account. Even at the local authority level, information is often closed, and where 
available there is little local communities can do to create space for alternative 
discourses or much to gain in doing so as the outcome would be a loss of 
resources and/or seat at the decision-making table. The formation of networks or 
coalitions at the local level is limited by competition over resources and claims to 
‘local knowledge.’46 Multi-level governance thus leads to a disaggregation of civil 
society based on competition rather than a cohesive voice or check on the 
government. Whilst this is emblematic of most civil society activity, and is an 
important component to its effectiveness, this division is constructed through 
economic incentive and only opens up the space for alternative ideas within a 
limited language and culture of doing health governance. Participation and 
inclusion remains relative and has the over-arching purpose of bringing civil society 
and the private sector into the state as a means of embedding multi-level 
governance and governance reform further.47 Hence the state is only held 
accountable to the international organisations that partner it. Those international 
organisations are only accountable to their directors and dominant member states, 
as for them good governance is more about state representation and transparency 
than their transparency. The result of this form of multi-level governance is the 
inclusion of multiple actors with limited good governance, in what is in effect a 
highly centralised system designed and orchestrated in global centres of decision-
making in Washington and Geneva. 
The highly centralised nature of decision-making suggests that multi-level 
governance remains a state-centric, hierarchical mode of organisation that rests on 
a separation of unequal power. Power in multi-level health governance is 
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organised in such a way as to limit influence of communities and local government, 
hide the relevance of international institutions and aid donors, and prioritise the 
state as the main site of good governance. Power in terms of agenda-setting and 
decision-making is located within international institutions and donors, mainly the 
World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and states within the G8. The 
governments and civil society actors within developing countries are only able to 
express power through project implementation and the delivery of services. This 
separation of power reflects a wider separation of the political from the economic 
and social within multilevel governance. Health governance is characterised and 
organised in such a way that policies and projects are presented as ‘apolitical’ in 
their nature as the central purpose of these policies is to deliver innovative health 
interventions to address the poverty and socio-economic determinants of poor 
health and disease. Politics and the political in this respect are substituted for 
governance as an organisational concept resting on good governance. Politics is 
seen as how power is organised within the state, and about competition, conflict 
and political parties, i.e. something that gets in the way of the implementation of 
global health objectives. Within multi-level health governance, this ‘politics’ should 
not be involved in addressing the socio-economic determinants of global health, 
and is abstracted from the nature and purpose of civil society. Applied to global 
health, Harmes’ understanding of multi-level governance as the separation from 
the economic and political is extended to the social through the inclusion, 
construction and limitations put on civil society actors.48 The result of this is a 
paradox between the apolitical nature of health and poverty governance as seen 
by actors and institutions within this multi-level system, and the highly political 
nature of how power is organised within multi-level governance as a centralised 
and hierarchical form. This separation is both the main basis and central problem 
of multi-level analysis. 
 
Why multi-level governance is not the answer for poverty reduction 
Revisiting the central problems with poverty governance outlined at the beginning 
of this paper in conjunction with the outcome of multi-sectoralism suggests instead 
of providing a solution, multi-level health governance further embeds these 
problems. Multi-level health governance is driven by foreign aid initiatives, mainly 
from bilateral and multilateral donors. This makes all non-global levels of 
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governance i.e. the state, civil society and local communities dependent on aid for 
the system to work effectively. Multi-level health governance extends this 
dependency in the following ways. First, it draws in the private sector to expand the 
source of foreign aid and the financial incentives in place within a system of multi-
level governance. Second, multi-level governance re-enforces the prominence of 
aid without a clear outcome, through its emphasis on rapid disbursal of funds to 
local community groups and national civil society organisations. The ‘sustainable’ 
aspect of these programmes leads to the establishment of governance systems in 
response to the health needs of the poor, which remain dependent on international 
aid and charitable giving to sustain them. Sustainability in this regard refers to the 
building of infrastructure, staff training and the development of good governance 
within state institutions. However, the effect of these initiatives is limited by a lack 
of political will or funds within the state to fully support them. Hence the problem of 
governing poverty and health is heightened from a dependency on general, 
project-specific vertical aid strategies, to dependency on horizontal, infrastructure-
based aid money. 
Situating the state at the centre of multi-level health governance allows for a 
re-enforcement of the ‘blame the state’ mentality, as any limitation to successful 
outcomes can be targeted at the central institution responsible for co-ordination: 
the state, or moreover the government. This mentality is embedded by the dual 
process of internationalisation of decision-making, and decentralisation of power 
within the state to local authorities and civil society organisations. In situating 
accountability, transparency and ownership wholly within the government, local 
authorities and community groups, any blame or responsibility is firmly entrenched 
within a broad definition of the state. Where global health initiatives fail, the blame 
can now be dispersed between local and national government authorities and 
community groups. Hence, instead of overcoming this problem, multi-level 
governance extends it further. 
The emphasis on the state within multi-level governance embeds the 
problems of international institutions associated with the governance of global 
poverty.  Multi-level health governance disaggregates responsibility and 
accountability in such a way that international institutions remain unseen in global 
health policy-making despite their presence and impact being very much felt. They 
operate through states in such a way as to diminish their responsibility. The new 
era of inclusion of governments and civil society organisations in decision-making 
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takes place in a pre-established framework, to limited outcome for these state-
based actors. Good governance becomes more of a challenge as these institutions 
work through not only governments, but local community groups and individuals, in 
implementing their strategies and agendas under the notion of multi-level 
governance. 
 
Conclusion 
Multi-level health governance provides a problem for the governance of poverty as 
opposed to a solution, because of its centralised and hierarchical nature and 
rescinding of space for alternative political voices and participation. Space for 
innovation exists within a narrow framework defined by global institutions. The 
possibility of opening such a framework is limited by the construction of civil society 
within a specific language and practice of doing global health governance. 
Alternative ‘mini publics’ or voice as to how global health could be practiced is 
limited by a lack of access to knowledge, and the need to frame such knowledge 
within this language and practice. This in turn facilitates a specific form of 
democratisation that promotes apolitical development centred around one 
programme or policy, not evidence of polyarchy in the form of competing interest 
and pressure groups and public opinion. 
Multi-level governance does not present an opportunity for wider 
participation or good governance, but embeds practices of bad governance – 
hidden decision-making, distorted separation of power, limited participation and 
lack of accountability – within global health structures. Bad governance is promoted 
by the separation of the political and economic from the social, and attempts to 
embed an economically-constructed form of community-based civil society within 
the state. This form of bad governance will affect multiple programmes and 
frameworks in which poverty governance become implemented, as initiatives follow 
the precedent set by global health interventions in global governance. 
In conclusion, the multi-level health governance does not provide an 
alternative to existing ways of governing global poverty. Any innovation it suggests 
refers to the bringing in of local communities and the private sector to existing 
hierarchical, state-centric mechanisms of promoting liberal democracy and reform 
of state institutions. Innovation that is based on alternative ideas or strategies 
either does not exist, or occupies the ‘outsider’ category that multi-level 
governance is supposed to overcome. This form of governance extends the ‘blame 
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the state nature’ of poverty governance to community groups and individuals, whilst 
limiting any form of accountability or visibility of the global institutions that set the 
parameters of this global health framework. For innovation or change to exist in the 
governance of poverty, multi-level governance as seen in global health strategies 
should be resisted, as it does not present an alternative but just a deepening of the 
same state-centric, hierarchical global governance developed over the last 100 
years. 
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